INTRODUCTION TO
THE SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE ARAB SPRING

A YODEJI K. PERRIN*
What quickly became known as the "Arab Spring" is a series of
protest movements, reforn1 movements, and revolutions (son1e
bloody and some relatively "bloodless") that l1as been ongoing for
more than two years in the n1ajority-Muslim world of the Middle
East and North Africa. Arab Spring recalls both the European
Re-volutions of 1848, dubbed the "Springtime of the Peop les," as
well as the Prague Spring of 1968. And the events have drawn
comparisons to the post-Soviet revolutions of 1989.
The
compilation of essays contained in this Special Issue of the Journal
of lntenwtiounl Lmu reflects on these events from a variety of
academic and pol icy perspectives, and grows out of the Journal's
Novem.ber 2011 symposium entitled "Democracy in the Niiddle
East."
1.

THE ARAB SPRING: DEFINED

In December 2010, high unemployment, food-price inflation,
political corruption, and suppression of freedom of speech and
other civil and politica l liberties precipitated n1ass unrest in
Tunisia. Sparked, literally and tragically, by the self-immolation of
I'v1ohammecl Bouazizi in a desperate plea for reform, the Tunisian
Revolution, also known as the Jasmine Revolution or the Sidi Bouzi
Revolt, in a mere twenty-eight days, achieved the resignation of
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after twenty-three years of
heavy-handed rule.
Oppressive regimes in Egypt, Libya; and Yemen were next to
fall. Ben Ali's capitulation on January 14, 2011 was followed on
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January 25 by Egyptians taking to the streets to protest the
authoritarian rule of Hosni M ubarak, a rule embodied i n the
interminable state of emergency law which supposedly justified
police brutality and suppression of civil and political liberties.
Much like his fellow head of state, Mubarak capitulated in the face
of some three weeks of public unrest, resigning on February 11.
In Libya, Colonel Qad dafi attempted to extinguish the
revolutionary spark before its flames could engulf his four-decade
rule by depicting his opponents as having al-Qaeda roots and ties.
On February 15, in Benghazi, Qaddafi's troops fired mercilessly on
protestors, only fanning the flan1es Qaddafi had hoped to douse.
During the civil war that followed, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution ,1973 (:tviarch 2011) to assist the Libyan rebels
by enforcing a no-fly zone over the country. The conflict finally
ended on October 20 when rebels seized Sirte, the town w here
Qaddafi had attempted to establish a new capital after Tripoli had
fallen into rebel hands. Qad dafi was killed in the process.
In Yemen, protests against economic conditions, proposed
constitutional reforms, and corruption that began on January 27
Uust two days after those in Egypt) matured into a den1and for the
resignation of beleaguered President Ali Abdullah Saleh and a
series of protests and skinnishes between pro- and anti
governn1ent groups. After Saleh reneged several times on signing
a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-negotiated arrange1nent to cede
p ower in exchange for in1munity, a failed assassination attempt on
June 3 forced Saleh into exile in Saudi Arabia. Saleh returne d to
Yerrten on September 23, signed the CCC initiative on Noven1ber
23, making way for elections, and formally ceded power to his
elected successor on February 27, 2012.
The Arab Spring is broader than these overthrows.
In
December 2010 and January 2011, shortly after the protests in
Tunisia began, a sud den spike in staple food prices and a wave of
self-irnmolations pron1pted mass protests in Algeria. On the san1e
day that Ben Ali resigned in Tunisia, Jordanians took to the streets
to protest unen1ployrrtent inflation, corruption, and to demand a
real constitutional monarchy. The conflagration spread to Oman,
with protests over depressed wages, unemployment, and
government corruption beginning on January 17. Protests in Iraq
over national security, corrup tion, and the country's poor
economic conditions began on February 12, 2011, occurrin£ iust
after lv1ubarak' s resignation in Egypt and just before the conflict in
Li.bva began. Protests in Bahrain, initiallv ca11inofor v-reater
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respect for hurnan rights and eventually demanding an end to the
Bahraini monarchy, began on February 14. On February 19 in
Kuwait . protests against the statelessness and denial of citizenship
rights of Kuwait's Bedoun population were part of a series of
protests demonstrating growing dissatisfaction with the
government. Protests in Morocco began the day after protests in
Kuwait, orchestrated primarily by the 20 February Youth
Movement. While King Mohammed appointed a cmnn1ission to
amend the constitution to permit n1ultiple political parties, further
concessions to constrain the crown and establish rule of law were
not forthcoming as the king maintain authority over the judiciary
and the security forces.
1\!Iost notably, in Syria, protests that began on March 15 calling
for an end to Ba' ath Party rule, by July 2011 had turned into a civil
war that continues to rage \Vhile President Bashar al-Assad clings
to power. The war has resulted in the deaths of sixty to seventy
thousand, including thirty thousand civilians. More than one
million Syrians have been d isplaced within the country, and
another one million refugees have fled Syria, crossing into Turkey
and Jordan. Nieanwhile, tens of thousands are reported to be
imprisoned and suffering torture and other human rights abuses at
the hands of the Syrian government. Government forces have
repeatedly fired on unarmed protestors and civilians; while rebel
group violations of international humanitarian law have also been
reporte d . Though the Syrian conflict at first overlapped with and
drew comparisons with the conflict in Libya, to which the Security
Council responded by authorizing the use of force; Russia and
China have effectively vetoed efforts to authorize the use of force
in Syria. The latest nevvs emerging from the conflict concerns the
p os s ibl e use of chemical vveapons by Assad, which might be
enough to finally bring about a multilateral intervention to end this
hun1anitarian crisis.
As the Arab Spring has evol\'ed into the Arab sununer, fall,
and >;vinter, it continues to warrant commentary and comparison.
Vvhat caused the Arab Spring? \1\lhat is its scope? And �;vhat
perpetuates it? Just as the moniker Prague Spring partly obscures
what was in son1e \vays the domestic front of a transnational
reaction to communist ideology, rhetoric .. and policy; so too does
the moniker Arab Spring obscure. The Arab Spring is more than a
protest n1ovement of ethnic Arabs or movements in Arab
countries, and the moniker obscures the role that ethnic and
minority
have played m these social
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movements - Jews in Tunisia, Coptic Christians in Egypt Berbers
in Libya and Morocco, Kurds in Iraq, Bedoun in Kuwait, Arabs in
Iran, black Africans in M auritania, and even Tuaregs in M ali. And,
as Princeton University' s professor of Near Eastern Studies Mirjam
Kunkler explained during the Journal Symposium, son1e even
speculate that the very roots of the Arab Spring lie not in Tunisia or
any one Arab country but in the failed "Persian A wakening" or
"Green Revolution" of June 2009, protesting the tainted re-election
of demagogue Mahmoud Ahmadinej a d to the Iranian presidency,
and then protesting the suppression of election protesters by the
Ahmadinejad regime.
And what of the Arab Spring's consequences? Will democracy
take hold? Or will military tyrants simply be replaced by Islan1ist
tyrants in some circumstances?
Will "cells" of the Muslim
Brotherhood allow the group to assert transnational influence that
comes to dominate in the region? Will Gul f countries a lign
themselves to resist the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood? Will
forging a unified policy to counter the Muslim Brotherhood bring
the Gulf countries closer together and turn the Gulf Cooperation
Council into a more forceful economic and security regime? Will
Iran, in its support of regimes in Syria and elsewhere facing
domestic social pressure to reform or resign, a lign itself against
Gulf countries and the Arab League?
2.

DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST : A SYMPOSIUTvl

These are among the questions addressed during the Journal's
November 2011 Symposium, organized in association with Penn
Law's International Human Rights Advocates, and con1prised of
two keynote lectures and three high-level panel discussions
featuring experts in Islamic law, l\1iddle East politics,
democratization, international communications, and human rights .
For example, the final p anel discussion w a s entitled "The Post
Revolutionary :Middle East: A Realistic Picture/' moderated by
Penn political scientist and constitutional a dvisor to Kurdistan and
Iraq, Brendan O'Leary. During the paneL Adnan Zulfiqar, Nabeel
Khoury, and Lina Khatib discussed the role of Islamic law in post
revolution politics. Zulfiqar, an expert on Islamic law, is the Law
& Public Policy Fellow at the Annenberg Center for Global
Communication Studies, a doctoral candidate in Near Eastern
Languages and Civilizations, and an alun1nus of Penn Law . Dr.
Khoury is a Minister Counselor in the U.S. Foreign Service and
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formerly Director of the Near East South Asia Office of the U.S.
State Department's Bureau of Intel l igence and Research. And Dr.
Khatib is co-founder and n1anager of the Progran1 on Arab Reforn1
and Democracy at Stanford University's Center on Democracy,
Development, and the Rule of Law.
Zulfiqar urged the audience not to take an ahistorical or non
contextual approach to the events in the region. On the one hand:
"It's difficult to dissociate religion fron1 the law w hen religion has
a prominent p lace amongst the constituency." On the other hand:
" [Avoiding] the tendency to consider the relationship between
religion and politics as uniform across the Muslim world" is just as
critical, because the role of Islan1ic l aw will vary in each country, as
many citizens view Islam as inherently oriented toward social
justice, and have therefore come to associate Islam with democracy
and as a counterbalance to authoritarian regimes . Thus, while in
all likelihood "Islam wil l be central to the construction of these
democracies because it is central to the lives of the people for
whom these democracies are being constructed," Islamic law in the
post-revolutionary Middle East will be "subject to the court of
popular opmwn."
(Zulfiqar' s premonitions were proven
warranted when, in June 2012, seven months after the Symposimn,
Egyptians elected Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood luminary
Niohammed Morsi to the presidency. Though Morsi attempted to
assuage Egyptian fears of partisanship by resigning from his
official positions with the Iviuslin1 Brotherhood and its political
wing - the Freedom and Justice Party, the Islamist trajectory is
clear.)
Dr. Khoury focused his con1mentary on what the Arab Spring
portends for regional cooperation and international politics.
Khourv observed that "the tradition has always been for
international actors to compete and regional actors to align."
While the 1950s through 1970s witnessed contestation among Arab
countries as to the ideal political systems and international
alliances to adopt, Khoury recalled the deliberate efforts to
minimize ideological differences in order to collaborate o n
economic, political, and security issues i n the wake of the Arab
Israeli War of 1973. While the 1970s and beyond 'vvere defined by
the decline of Soviet influence and the ascendance of Islam as a
unifying force, the real meaning of the Arab Spring, from the U.S.
foreign policy perspective, is that as "[t]raditional axes in the
region are being reshaped[,] U .S. alliances in the region wil l look
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the transition and keeping good relations with Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries knowing our perspectives are diverging
more an d more and there will be tensions and problen1s." Like
Zulfiqar, Khoury noted that Islamist parties were seizing power in
the post-revolution moments. "These Islamist parties [ . . ] have
values and priorities that n1ay differ fron1 the pro-Western regin1es
that preceded then1, but in the end they're willing to cornpron1ise
and negotiate in the international arena."
Dr. Khatib predicts that democracy w ill have exercised an
overall "positive effect" on the countries that experienced some
taint of the Arab Spring. //Even if the coming period sees a
regression/ we can say the status quo and the region has definitely
changed/ and there is no turning back." As Khatib intin1ates in the
essay published here, entitled Political Participation and Democratic
Transition in the Arab World,1 which expands on her Syrnposiun1
presentation, change can be attributed, at least in part/ to the
convergence of formal and informal spheres of political
participation: such as the growth of Tunisian political parties after
the revolution. Democratic ideals, hovvever, are insufficient for
lasting democracy, she told the audience. Instead, //organization,
leadership, program, strategy, coalitions, and resources" are the six
essential factors that w ill make lasting democracy a true
possibility.
Because forn1al political space has becon1e
progressively more accessible to citizens, and a gradual
/'institutionalization of opposition/' is also foreseeable (in contrast
with the prior tendency of authoritarian regimes to forbid and
eliminate opposition parties), there is reason for hope.
Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a Penn Law alun1nus who is On1ar
and Azn1eralda Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the
UCLA School of Law and holds the Chair in Islam and Citizenship
at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, concluded the
Symposium with an address entitled "Is Liberty God's Law?
Slwri'n, the 1\!Iilitary and the Arab Revolutions." In his remarks,
reproduced here as The Praetorian State in the Arab Spring/ Dr.
Abou El Fadl called for increased scholarship concerning the
sociological and political catalysts of revolutions in ''subaltern or
.
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postcolonial" states. While Zulfiqar and Khoury discussed the role

of the Islamic religion in post-revolution politics, and Kha tib noted
the growth of formal political parties and the inclusion of infon11al
political networks in the policy-n1aking process, Abou El Fadl
addressed a third variable - the n1ilitary.
Turning to Egypt as a case study, Abou El Fadl discusses the
"militarization of the state" as one of the key factors shaping the
Middle Eastern revolutions. When the members of the army, who
view themselves as indispensable to society, populate the ranks of
governn1ent and the private sector, "[t]his [becomes] part of the
reality that revolutions - whether in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria or
Yemen - have to confront and deal with" for den1ocratization to be
possible. As Abou El Fadl explains, the military ideology is onl y
partly rooted i n the Islamic culture shared b y the rest of society.
:tv1ilitary ideology is also rooted in the notion that the military
should not only defend territory but should control political
society.
In spite of participants in the Egyptian revolution
invoking such slogans as "the army and the peopl e are one hand"
in hopes of neutralizing the potential for military repression, the
schism dividing the military and civilian consciousness is evinced
in military attacks on praying citizens and bombardment of
religious buildings. Thus, Abou El Fadl asks, "VVhat does it mean
to speak of a democratic revolution in a state vvhere the n1ilitary
has become its own n1onstrous interest?"
3.

THE ARAB SPRING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, SECURITY?

The conversation continues and expands beyond those
addressed at the Syrnposium. In the essays included in this special
issue, Lama Abu Odeh and Ann Elizabeth l\1a yer focus their
comments on the cases of Egypt and Libya. Tn Of Lrrw and
Rcuoluhon,3 Professor Abu Odeh argues that Egyptian factions
engaged in contestation over the nation's future chose lavv a s tl.1e
fon!m for the conflict: constitutional amend.ments and
declarations, parliamentary laws and legislati\'e anl.endrnents,
military decrees, presidential decrees, emergency la \�</S rescinded
and reissued, court trials, and constitutional court decisions.
Meanwhile, even the judiciary has entered the fray with its
statements in the rnedia. To Abu Odeh, the public r e li a n c e on L:nv
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and courts and the public criticism of the judiciary's actions (or
inactions) represent the citizenry's revolutionary atte1npts to define
the concept "rule of law." These attempts to define rule of law for
Egypt, since the judiciary seems unable or unwilling to do so, are
revolutionary because they contravene social hierarchical norms
that would normally exclude the masses frmn such a project.
Professor Mayer also examines the rule of l aw project,
considering the potential for Libya after the revolution . In Building
tlze New Libya: Lessons to Learn and Unlenrrz,4 although Mayer
suggests that, in the aftern1ath of the Libyan Rev o luti on, it is
possible to observe the potential that l iving under the Qaddafi
regime and "revulsion at Qaddafi's excesses insti ll[ed] a
determination to ensure a future when criminal justice would
adhere to international rules and when respect for human rights
would be secured," she points out that there is much evidence to
suggest that the contrary norm of brutality has been instil le d
among Libyans after four decades of Qaddafi' s repressive rule. For
example, the Inanner in which Libyans- y oung rebels fighting in
militias- captured Qaddafi, beat him, sumn1arily executed him,
and then placed his festering corpse on display in a n1eat l ocker in
Misrata, instead of handing Qaddafi over to the International
Crin1inal Court w hich had issued an indictment and arrest vvarrant
for Qaddafi in July 2011.
Consider also the indefinite and
incommunicado detention of Saif al-Qaddafi and the team of
attorneys that the ICC sent to represent him. Meanw hile, rival
armed militias, parroting the brutality of the Qaddafi regi1ne, face
no restraint from any fonnal military (Qaddafi had enfeebled the
mil itary during his rule in order to avert coup attempts), thus the
terrorist attacks on international agencies, aid workers, and U.S.
and British embassies and officials . In short, Ivlayer remarks that
the post-revolutionary environment in Libya is one of
"law lessness" in contrast to the dilemma that Abou E l Fadl
observes in Egypt-the "Praetorian" or militarized state. On the
other hand, Libya, like Egypt, is also witnessing the rise to
prominence of Islamists and continued resistance to women's
rights.
1V1eanwhile, although the protest movements that typify the
Arab Spring did not result in (or devolve into) civil war in most
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cases, Amit Chhabra, Amos Guiora, and Jordan J. Paust
nevertheless address the most pressing security issues that arise
from the Arab Spring. Professor Chhabra takes our conversation
from the domestic rule of law considerations to the question of
what the Arab Spring portends for U.S. foreign policy in the
region. In Autumnal Rage: Playing ·with Islmnic Fire,s Chhabra
revisits the notion that the outcome of the Arab Spring might be
Islamicization of Muslin1 society (as Zulfiqar and Khoury similarly
had noted), and ponders the consequences of that ideological shift
for use of force rules, counterterrorism cooperation, and human
rights in the region and in l ight of customary international law on
humanitarian interventions. Where Mayer hints at the anti-U.S.
tenor of events subsequent to the revolutions as a symptom of
lawlessness, Chhabra uses these developments - the death of
Ambassador Stevens in the Benghazi attacks-as the focal point of
his inquiry into the role that Islam will play in continued U.S.
engagen1ent in the "Muslim world."
Amos Guiora also picks up the security thread in Humanitarian
Intervention and SmJereignty under tlze Umbrella of Geo-Politics/)
describing the triangular relationship between these three factors
as shifting after the Arab Spring, requiring foreign policy makers
to consider vvhether their bureaucratic orientations and practices
are sufficient to address the evolving dynamic among these
concepts. While there are echoes here of (and explicit reference to)
the ongoing discussion of the doctrine known as the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P or RtoP), Professor Guiora's central point is how
that "responsibility" will be met given well-entrenched public
policy positions, new leadership to engage, or new socio-political
norms in �v1uslim countries. Guiora contrasts the geopolitical
circumstances of Syria with Libya to challenge the conventional
stories regarding the inactivity of the international community
despite mounting death tolls in Syria and the tired rhetoric of
never agam.
If Guiora is in part addressing the use of force of foreign
powers within a country facing a human rights or humanitarian
crisis; in Use of Force in Sy ri o by Turkey, NATO, nud. the United
•
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St·ntes/ Jordan Faust is addressing the legality of the use of force

when internal turmoil threatens either international peace and
security or the national security of a neighboring state. In both
cases, there are international rules, incl uding the U.N. Charter, that
govern whether states and regional organizations m. a y use n1ilitary
force on the territory of another state. But while Guiora's question
is, for example, whether human rights abuses n1ay justify
intervention to spare Syrian civilians from the atrocities of the
Assad regime, Professor Faust's question is whether there are legal
justifications for the use of force in Syria.
For example, do refugee flows and skirmishes that spill over
Syria's borders into Turkey justify Turkey and others to use force
to bring about an end to the Syrian conflict? Exmnining the
constitutive charters of NATO, the Organization of American
States, the African Organization for African Unity j African Union,
and the League of Arab States, as well as the legal posturing of the
OAS during the Cuban missile crisis and NATO during the war in
Kosovo, Faust concludes that border skinnishes and other threats
to international peace and security can give rise to armed conflict
vvhich vvould justify Turkish use of force in self-defense. Faust's
position, which captures one perspective among international
lawyers, offers a view of the security concerns that arise out of the
Arab Spring, where, at any moment, it seems, an internal conflict
might morph into an internal nnned conflict which n1ight morph
into an intenmtional arn1ed conflict. Given the presence of U.S.
personnel in Jordan, counterterrorisn1 concerns of al Qaeda
obtaining Syrian chemical and biological weapons, and U.S.
recognition of the Syrian opposition, the use of force in Syria by the
United States, Jordan, Turkey, or NATO could be in the future, and
could be lawful.
4.

BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING?

So many questions remain. \Vhither Israel? If anarchy prevails
in son1e Arab Spring countries, will the inability, for example, of
Egyptians to control the Sinai, and of Jordanians and Syrians to
exercise effective control of their territories, turn parts of these
countries in to n1iniature Afghanistans - new training grounds for
terrorists, and justifying the use of force agair1st these states or
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against the non-state actors residing in their territory? VVill Israel's
attacks in Palestine against Ha1nas rejuvenate the Arab-Israeli
conflict given Hamas' links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
and other countries? Will the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral
success encourage the group to p lay the role of peace-maker
between Israel and Hamas, as it did in December 2012? Or will
Egypt's support of Fatah-Han1as reconciliation only antagonize
Israel and further stall the Arab-Israeli peace process?
Whither Africa? vVhile the Arab Spring began in and spread
quickly to the maj ority-Arab and Muslim countries of North
Africa- Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya; the contagion see1ningly
spread east (to Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yen1en, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain:
the UAE), rather than south and west to black Africa. 1Nith some
notable exceptions.
Protests in rv1auritania began January 20, 2011 after the self
immolation of Yacoub Ould Dahoud (modeled on the December
2010 self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi that had sparked
unrest in Tunisia), with com.plaints including black market slavery
and racist census-taking. In Sudan, Al-Amin Moussa Al-Amin set
himself on fire on January 23, 2011. Demonstrators invited their
Sudanese compatriots to act in solidarity with the movements in
Tunisia and Egypt, but the regime of infamous war criminal and
genocidnire Omar Hassan Al-Bashir was generally able to suppress
the smail protests. Bashir seems to have escaped the contagion of
the Arab Spring with his regime intact. Protests in nearby Djibouti
began on January 28, 2011. They were increasingly violent with
the government of Ismail Omar Guelleh using batons and tear gas,
mass arrests, the detention of protest leaders, torture, and shows of
police force agair1st the stone-throwing demonstrators to stamp out
the nascent mm:ement which fizzled and died by April of that
year .
In Mali, Taureg fighters, returning from the Libyan conflict,
fueled an ethnic separatist conflict in the Azawad region, resulting
in the March 2012 coup d'etat that ousted President Amadou
Toumani Tmue, and the April 6 declaration o f Azawad
independence from Maii by the National Movement for Liberation
of Azawad (lviNLA). In the months that followed, Islarn.ists
factions prevailed in their the internecine conflict with the MNLA;
the military intervention of France and the African Union on behalf
of the Mali government in January 2013 resulted in the return of
Azaw21d to Malinese control. Have the Tuareg rebels and the Arab
PublishedSpring
by Penn Law:unintentionally
Legal Scholarship Repository,
2013
brought
about the "return" of France to
\

Xll

U. Pn. f. In t 'l L .

[Vol. 34:2

\Nest Africa, remm1scent of colonial-era control over African
politics and security and post-independence meddling by the
former colonial power in African affairs?
The conversations might just be beginning regarding the
implications of the revolutionary moments in the Muslim World
that began in January 201 1 . Conflict and instability continues to
typify life in Syria, Egypt, l\llali, and elsewhere in the region. How
the Arab Spring will impact Israel, Iran, counterterrorisn1, U.S.
foreign policy, and the development of internation a l hun1anitarian
laiN - rules regarding the use of force, humanitarian intervention,
and the responsibility to protect - remains to be seen. The Jo u rnnl
of In te nw tionnl Lnw is proud to have chosen to address these topics
i n its 201 1 annual symposium, and to present this Special Issue on
the legacy of the Arab Spring.
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